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Every piece of sex offender legislation has a compelling political backstory. 
No different is the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 
2006 (SORNA), which aims to build a comprehensive national sex 
offender registry in the United States. However, lost in the passionate 
determination to eliminate sexual crime is a rational cost-benefit analysis 
of state compliance. This note describes the long-standing problem of 
compliance with SORNA and identifies cost as a key contributor to state 
noncompliance. With the principal purpose of SORNA in mind, this note 
then proposes different approaches to addressing the financial barriers to 
SORNA and evaluates each response in light of compliance. Ultimately, 
this note calls for a change of focus in the way that politicians and 
legislators look at implementing SORNA, as well as other sex offender 
legislation in the United States.
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Eleven days into trial, former New York Governor George E. Pataki was on the 
witness stand.1 At 6 feet, 5 inches, Pataki—even while seated—exuded an impressive 
presence that was felt by the courtroom’s attentive listeners. Pataki’s lawyer, Abbe 
Lowell, prompted his client to describe a “personal incident” to the jury, and Pataki 
responded:
My wife and I would always . . . go hiking in the state parks where we live, 
and we went for a hike with my youngest child, my son, and three or four 
neighbor kids and another neighbor. Sometime in either ’95 or ’96, in 
thousands of acres of wilderness, there was one individual, a male who, when 
no one else was around, would continually stand and walk right next to us, 
and we would even go off the trail for a view. He would walk right out and 
stand next to the kids. I was a governor, so the State Police were down the 
trail, so I called them and the State Police came, and they started asking the 
man why he was following us and following the children.
I was advised later on that he . . . had been convicted of sexual crimes in the 
Rochester area.2
Pataki went on to explain that the incident brought to his attention “not just . . . the 
horrors of these [sexual] crimes, but the immediacy of the[ir] possibility.”3
1. Much of the anecdote that follows is based on my own observation. From June to August 2013, I served 
as a legal intern in the Litigation Bureau of the Office of the New York State Attorney General. During 
my internship, I worked exclusively on Bailey v. Pataki, 708 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 2013). The Bailey trial 
began on July 9, 2013, and concluded with the jury’s verdict on July 31, 2013. Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the 
U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, presided.
2. Transcript of Trial at 2113, Bailey v. Pataki, No. 08-CV-8563 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013).
3. Id. at 2113–14. Pataki told the jury: “I had [state] troopers, but I couldn’t help but think of a mother in 
a walk in the park with a child or a child at a playground . . . .” Id. at 2113. 
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 In 2008, the plaintiffs in Bailey v. Pataki filed a complaint against the former 
governor and a number of other high-ranking New York State executives.4 The six 
convicted sex offenders claimed that their constitutional due process rights were 
violated when the Pataki administration implemented the Sexually Violent Predator 
Initiative (“SVP Initiative”) in 2005.5 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they 
were unlawfully confined to state mental hospitals at the conclusion of their prison 
sentences for committing sexually violent crimes.6
 Along with Pataki, five of the six plaintiffs testified when the case went to trial 
in August of 2013.7 During plaintiff Robert Warren’s cross-examination, he was 
questioned about his sex offender registration status:
Q.  Mr. Warren, you are required to register as a sex offender in the State of 
New York, right?
A.  Well, that depends on the state I have residency. Wherever you reside, 
that’s where you’re required to register. So I reside here right now, so I 
register here. If I moved to Oregon, when I have been there, I [was] 
required to register in Oregon and not in New York.
Q.  You are currently registered in Oregon. Is that true?
A. I am currently registered in New York.
Q.  And information concerning your Sex Offender Registry is available to 
the public, isn’t it . . . ?
A.  Not in Oregon, it is not. In Oregon, it is not.
Q.  In New York it is?
A.  I think so, yes. I am not a resident of New York State right now.8 
 Plaintiff Louis Massei was also questioned about his registration status as a sex 
offender:
Q.  Now, Mr. Massei, as a result of your rape conviction, you’re required to 
register under the Sex Offender Registration Act. Is that true?
A.  That is correct, too.
Q.  As a result of having to register, you have to register your address at least 
once a year with Albany. Is that correct?
A.  No. I don’t live in New York. I don’t register with Albany.
4. See Amended Complaint for Damages, Bailey v. Pataki, No. 08-Civ-8563 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2009).
5. See Amended Complaint for Damages, supra note 4, at 1–3; see also Benjamin Weiser, At Trial, Pataki 
Says Sex Offender Trailed Family, N.Y. Times, July 24, 2013, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/07/24/nyregion/in-trial-over-confinement-pataki-says-sex-offender-trailed-his-family-on-
hike.html.
6. See Weiser, supra note 5. Plaintiffs’ main claim was that their procedural due process rights were violated 
when they were committed without: notice, psychiatric examinations by court-appointed physicians, or 
a judicial hearing prior to commitment. See Bailey, 708 F.3d at 398.
7. Plaintiff Jorge Burgos was deceased at the time of trial and was thus unable to testify.
8. Transcript of Trial, supra note 2, at 1472–73.
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Q.  You have to register where you live?
A.  Right.
Q.  You have to register at least once a year?
A.  Yes.
Q.  If you move, you have to provide them with a new address?
A.  Whenever I move, I just provide them with whatever address I live at.
Q.  And information relating to your conviction is available to the public?
. . . .
A.  In the State of New York, my information is available. Because I live in 
the State of North Dakota, and I wasn’t convicted under their system, I 
am not listed on their system because I was not given a level hearing. I am 
not listed where I live. I am listed in New York. In North Dakota if 
someone wants to know about me, they put me in the system. I don’t 
come up as a sex offender in the State of North Dakota or Oregon.
THE COURT: We get the idea.9
 The plaintiffs’ testimony during the Bailey trial revealed the complexity and 
possibility for error in a fragmented sex offender registration system comprised of fifty 
individual states, the District of Columbia, the five principal U.S. territories, and 
Indian tribes.10 What are the cracks in the system and how often do these breakdowns 
occur? I was curious, and commenced a line of research to learn the nature and 
structure of sex offender registration and notification in the United States.
 In addition to government programs such as the SVP Initiative, sex offenders are 
regulated by extensive federal and state legislation.11 One of these laws is the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (AWA),12 which establishes a standardized, 
offense-based classification system for sex offenders.13 The AWA specifically aims to 
strengthen the national network of sex offender registration and notification programs, 
thus potentially closing the registration loopholes highlighted by the plaintiffs’ 
9. Id. at 1341–43.
10. This note focuses primarily on the issue of state compliance with the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA). However, many of the arguments concerning state compliance with 
SORNA may equally apply to the U.S. territories and Indian tribes.
11. See discussion infra Part II.
12. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991 (2013)). 
13. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification 21–26 (2008) [hereinafter SORNA Guidelines], available at http://www.smart.gov/
pdfs/final_sornaguidelines.pdf.
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testimony in Bailey.14 However, this federal law, which has been described as 
“ambitious,” has been met with much resistance from the states.15
 This note focuses on Title I of the AWA—the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (SORNA)16—and examines through an economic and financial lens 
the widespread failure of states to fully comply with the law. A number of SORNA 
requirements are highly expensive to implement—in particular, the directive to change 
from a risk assessment classification system to a tier-based offense system.17 State 
legislatures must weigh the benefits of complying with SORNA’s requirements to 
determine whether they are worth the potential cost of implementation.18
 Part II of this note presents a historical background of sex offender legislation, 
including an extensive overview of SORNA and the AWA. Part III examines state 
SORNA compliance and identifies cost as a key contributor to state noncompliance. 
Part IV proposes and assesses viable solutions to address the economic and financial 
difficulties that SORNA poses. Part V adds yet another layer to the discussion with 
a brief analysis of SORNA’s federalism implications. Part VI concludes this note.
ii. thE histOrY and baCKgrOUnd Of sOrna
 Historically, society’s view of sex offenders has been “one of intolerance rather 
than compassion.”19 The roots of U.S. sex offender laws can be traced back to the 
United Kingdom’s dangerous offender legislation, which applied predominantly to 
property offenses in the 1900s.20 By the 1930s, the focus of sex offender legislation 
had “shifted to perverts whose sexual urges caused increasingly violent behavior.”21 
14. See id. at 4. 
15. See Adam Walsh Act Update: State Resistance to Comply and Federal Leniency in Compliance Review, Nat’l 
Juv. Just. Network (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/Update%20on%20
State%20Compliance%20with%20AWA%208%205%2011.pdf (“States have resisted implementing the 
Act for numerous reasons including: confidence in their current state registration laws[,]  .  .  . concern 
about the legislation’s high costs of implementation[,] .  .  . and concern over the negative public safety 
and rehabilitation effects of placing youth on any registry, public or private.”).
16. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 590 (2006) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16962).
17. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1.
18. This note does not address the effectiveness of the sex offender registration systems in protecting the 
public from sexual predators, but focuses instead on the fiscal problems facing SORNA implementation 
in the United States. Supporters of sex offender registration maintain that registries are a law 
enforcement tool—“an ability to allow the public to take measures to protect themselves”—while critics 
argue that community notification creates barriers to successful treatment and can destabilize offenders. 
See Emanuella Grinberg, 5 Years Later, States Struggle to Comply with Federal Sex Offender Law, CNN 
(July 28, 2011, 11:51 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/07/28/sex.offender.adam.walsh.act/.
19. Melissa Wangenheim, Note, “To Catch a Predator,” Are We Casting Our Nets Too Far?: Constitutional 
Concerns Regarding the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 62 Rutgers L. Rev. 559, 568 (2010).
20. See Laura J. Zilney & Lisa Anne Zilney, Perverts and Predators: The Making of Sexual 
Offending Laws 66 (2009) (“At this time the notion of a ‘sexual psychopath’ was equated with 
immorality, and thus the focus was primarily placed on gay men and other ‘indecent’ offenses.”). 
21. Id. at 66–67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The ideology during this era focused on rehabilitation, and viewed sex offenders as 
“mentally sick” individuals.22 Sexual psychopath laws developed, calling for the 
“involuntary” and “indefinite” commitment of offenders to psychiatric facilities.23 
The concept of registering offenders also originated in the 1930s.24 In 1937, Florida 
was the first state to adopt a registration law, but only required registration for 
persons convicted of felonies involving “moral turpitude.”25
 Initially, the enactment and enforcement of sex offender registration laws largely 
remained with the states.26 In 1947, California enacted the first set of registration 
laws, requiring law enforcement agencies to compile a list of sex offenders to be used 
as an enforcement tool.27 By 1989, only twelve states had registration laws targeting 
convicted sex offenders.28 During the 1990s, high-profile sexual assaults and murders 
of children encouraged a “renewed interest in harsh sex offender legislation” at both 
the state and federal level.29 In 1990, Washington became the first state to enact a 
law requiring sex offenders to register in a public registry not limited to law 
enforcement use.30
 On September 13, 1994, President Bill Clinton signed into law the first set of 
federal sex offender laws in the United States, remarking:
From now on, every State in the country will be required by law to tell a 
community when a dangerous sexual predator enters its midst. We respect 
people’s rights, but today America proclaims there is no greater right than a 
parent’s right to raise a child in safety and love.31
The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children Sex Offender Registration Act 
(“Wetterling Act”)32 “served as the backbone and catalyst for federal sex offender 
22. Id. at 71.
23. Id. (noting that Michigan passed the United States’ first sexual psychopath law in 1937).
24. Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Past, Present, and Future, 34 
New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement, Winter 2008, at 4. State and local governments were 
concerned about offenders seeking “anonymous refuge within their growing populations” and enacted 
registration laws in response. Id.
25. Id. at 5. 
26. Richard A. Paladino, Note, The Adam Walsh Act as Applied to Juveniles: One Size Does Not Fit All, 40 
Hofstra L. Rev. 269, 273 (2011).
27. See id. at 273–74. For nearly the next fifty years, sex offender registry information was accessible only by 
law enforcement personnel. Id. at 274.
28. Logan, supra note 24, at 5.
29. Zilney & Zilney, supra note 20, at 83; see also Logan, supra note 24, at 5 (“From 1990 onward, however, 
public policy radically changed when a handful of high-profile sexual assaults of children by ex-offenders 
inspired legislative attention.”). 
30. Logan, supra note 24, at 5. Washington’s registration law permitted “dissemination of identifying 
information on registrants to communities in which registrants lived.” Id.
31. Paladino, supra note 26, at 277.
32. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. 
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071–14703 (2006 & Supp. 
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registration laws.”33 The Wetterling Act, which had the complete bipartisan support of 
Congress, mandated that all states implement a sex-offender registry34 and sought to 
better safeguard the public against sexual predators by requiring sex offenders to 
register with their state at the completion of their prison, jail, or parole sentences.35 
Although twenty-four states had already enacted sex offender registration laws, 
Congress sought to impose uniform federal registration standards to prevent offenders 
from simply relocating to states that did not require registration.36 The Wetterling Act 
generally set out the minimum standards for state sex offender registration programs37 
and, by 1996, every state had enacted a form of sex offender registration law.38
 While allowing for community notification, the Wetterling Act did not require 
it.39 In July of 1994, shortly before its enactment, the brutal murder of seven-year-old 
Megan Kanka led New Jersey legislators to “cobble[] together a bill requiring the 
state to assess sex offenders regarding their dangerousness to the community and to 
subsequently give notice to the community when that level of dangerousness rose to 
a serious enough level.”40 Two years later, a 1996 amendment, dubbed “Megan’s 
Law,”41 mandated that every sex offender register for community notification and 
III 2010)), repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 
Stat. 587 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991).
33. Paladino, supra note 26, at 274–75.
34. See id. at 275.
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 275–76. Congress could not mandate that the states enact the Wetterling Act, so it “backed its 
directive with a threat to withhold ten percent of otherwise allocated federal funding if states did not 
adopt and implement registration and community notification laws.” Logan, supra note 24, at 5–6.
37. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Megan’s Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes 
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, as Amended, A.G. 
Order No. 2196-98 (1998), available at http://cl.bna.com/cl/19990120/2196.htm.
38. See Logan, supra note 24, at 6.
39. Brittany Enniss, Note, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the Well-Intended Adam Walsh Act Led to 
Unintended Consequences, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 697, 700. “As of 1996, only seventeen states allowed for 
notification, either via public inspection or direct community notification.” Logan, supra note 24, at 6.
40. Enniss, supra note 39; see also Logan, supra note 24, at 5 (“New Jersey’s rapid adoption of registration 
and notification, in the wake of Megan Kanka’s sexual abuse and murder by a convicted sex offender 
living nearby, fueled national interest in the social control strategies. The laws quickly swept the nation, 
with legislatures often adopting in verbatim from one another’s legislative findings.”). I interviewed Dr. 
Louis Schlesinger, a psychologist who was appointed by the president of the New Jersey Senate and 
acting governor to serve as a member of a Senate Task Force that rewrote Megan’s Law in 2001. Dr. 
Schlesinger, who is still in contact with Megan Kanka’s parents, explained that Maureen Kanka would 
not have allowed her daughter to walk around her neighborhood freely if she had known that a previously 
convicted sex offender lived on her street. Telephone Interview with Louis B. Schlesinger, Ph.D., 
Professor of Forensic Psychology at John Jay Coll. of Criminal Justice (Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter 
Schlesinger Interview]; see also Paladino, supra note 26, at 276 (“It was believed that had Megan’s parents 
been aware and notified that their neighbor was a sex offender, they would have taken the proper steps 
necessary to prevent Megan’s death.”); Our Mission, Megan Nicole Kanka Found., http://www.
megannicolekankafoundation.org/mission.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
41. Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1994)).
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“required states to release relevant information to the community” by some method.42 
Although Megan’s Law was adopted in some shape or form in all fifty states,43 the 
interpretation of what “relevant information” entailed varied from state to state.44
 Federal law did not impose criminal liability on individuals who violated Megan’s 
Law until July 27, 2006 when the AWA45 was signed into law by President George 
W. Bush.46 The AWA, passed in the memory of six-year-old victim Adam Walsh, 
aimed to establish a comprehensive national registration system “[i]n order to protect 
the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response to the 
vicious attacks by violent predators.”47 The co-sponsor of the bill’s original Senate 
version, then-Delaware Senator Joseph Biden, stated: “Plain and simple, this 
legislation, I can say with certainty, will save children’s lives.”48
 SORNA provides a comprehensive set of minimum standards49 for sex offender50 
registration and notification in the United States,51 aiming to close potential gaps 
and loopholes52 that existed under prior federal law, as well as “strengthen[ing] the 
nationwide network of sex offender registration and notification programs.”53 The 
underlying goals of SORNA are to “curb recidivism once an initial penalty has been 
served and to make it easier for law enforcement authorities to track post-conviction 
offenders.”54 Practically, SORNA seeks to realize an effective and comprehensive 
42. Enniss, supra note 39, at 700 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
43. See Franklin E. Zimring, An American Travesty: Legal Responses to Adolescent Sexual 
Offending 5 (2009).
44. See Enniss, supra note 39.
45. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16991 (2013)).
46. See Paladino, supra note 26, at 277–78.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 16901.
48. Paladino, supra note 26, at 279.
49. SORNA “sets a f loor, not a ceiling,” for jurisdictions’ sex offender registration and notification 
programs. SORNA Guidelines, supra note 13, at 6.
50. Under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act (AWA), a sex offender is defined as any 
“individual who was convicted of a sex offense.” 42 U.S.C. § 16911.
51. See SORNA Guidelines, supra note 13, at 3.
52. [T]he AWA . . . contains the most ambitious requirements to date. This zenith resulted 
from congressional concern that state registration and community notification laws 
were “weak” and fraught with “loopholes,” and that their diverse nature created a 
“patchwork” permitting registrants to evade continued scrutiny, especially as a result of 
inter-state travel.
 Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 
51, 84 (2008).
53. SORNA, Office Justice Programs, http://www.smart.gov/sorna.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015) 
[hereinafter SORNA]. 
54. Jacob Frumkin, Note & Comment, Perennial Punishment? Why the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act Needs Reconsideration, 17 J.L. & Pol’y 313, 314 (2008).
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national system of sex offender registration through the cooperative effort of each of 
the fifty states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. territories, and Indian tribal 
governments.55
 SORNA creates a national registry by mandating that each jurisdiction56 maintain 
a jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry. It outlines the registry requirements, 
establishes three tiers of sex offenders that are subject to these requirements,57 and 
instructs the U.S. attorney general to issue specific guidelines and regulations on how 
to implement it.58 SORNA also creates the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, 
Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (“SMART Office”), which 
administers the registration and notification standards and assists jurisdictions with 
their implementation.59
 A sex offender must register in the jurisdiction in which the offender was convicted, 
resides, is employed, and attends school.60 The offender must keep current his or her 
registration information and is given only three business days to update a change of 
name, residence, employment, or student status.61 Additionally, each offender must 
provide personal information to the National Sex Offender Registry, including: the 
offender’s name, Social Security number, address, name and address of employer, 
school name and location, license plate number and vehicle description, as well as any 
additional information required by the attorney general.62 The information is retained 
in a national database at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the public can access 
this information via the “Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website.”63
55. See SORNA Guidelines, supra note 13, at 5. SORNA “[e]xtends the jurisdictions in which registration 
is required beyond the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the principal U.S. territories, to include 
also federally recognized Indian tribes.” SORNA, supra note 53.
56. For purposes of sex offender registration and notification, and thus the discussion in this note, 
“ jurisdiction” refers to each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the five principal U.S. 
territories and federally recognized Indian tribes that elect to function as registration jurisdictions. See 
SORNA, supra note 53; see also 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2013).
57. See id. § 16911(2)–(4). For more information on the three-tiered system and how each tier is defined, see 
infra note 140. The main effects of SORNA include the incorporation of “a more comprehensive group 
of sex offenders and sex offenses for which registration is required,” as well as “more extensive 
registration information” available to the public. SORNA, supra note 53. SORNA also requires sex 
offenders to make periodic in-person appearances and increases the required minimum duration of 
registration. Id.
58. Paladino, supra note 26, at 279. The U.S. Department of Justice released tentative guidelines on May 17, 
2007. See Summary of Final National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification for 
Implementation of SORNA, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Jan. 2009), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
civil-and-criminal-justice/summary-of-final-national-guidelines-sorna.aspx. Final guidelines were 
subsequently released in July 2008. See id.
59. See SORNA Guidelines, supra note 13, at 3.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a).
61. Id. § 16913(c).
62. Id. § 16914(a)(1)–(7). 
63. Paladino, supra note 26, at 280. The National Sex Offender registry provides “a physical description of 
the sex offender, the criminal offense that the sex offender is registered for, the criminal history of the 
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 The AWA directs states to impose criminal penalties on an offender who fails to 
comply with the registry requirements.64 Additionally, state-convicted sex offenders 
who knowingly fail to properly register may be subject to prosecution under a new 
federal statute that subjects them to fines and up to ten years imprisonment.65 Thus, 
failing to register can potentially cause an offender to be sentenced for a longer prison 
term than that imposed for the initial sex crime itself.66 SORNA also mandates a 
community notification program, which requires the appropriate official in the 
jurisdiction to notify the U.S. attorney general, law enforcement agencies, schools, 
and public housing agencies in the state(s) in which the offender is registered.67
 Behind SORNA and virtually every piece of U.S. sex offender legislation is a 
compelling political backstory.68
Citizens cannot understand a sex attack on a child, and this incomprehensibly 
fuels reactions of fear.  .  .  . The attack and investigation become front-page 
news  .  .  . describing the failure of the justice system to protect vulnerable 
persons, which fuels a strong public reaction. . . . Government officials then 
feel compelled to act.69
sex offender[,]  .  .  . a current photograph of the offender, [a] DNA sample of the sex offender, and 
fingerprints of the sex offender.” Id. 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(e) (“Each jurisdiction, other than a Federally recognized Indian tribe, shall provide a 
criminal penalty that includes a maximum term of imprisonment that is greater than 1 year for the failure 
of a sex offender to comply with the requirements of this subchapter.”). To be considered compliant with 
SORNA, a jurisdiction must meet this requirement. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act: Substantial Implementation Checklist 24 [hereinafter 
SORNA Checklist], available at http://www.smart.gov/FillableChecklistwSuppGuidelines.doc. 
However, states that have not yet substantially implemented SORNA may nonetheless have penalties 
within their own existing systems that meet the federal standard. For example, the New York Sex Offender 
Registration Act provides:
Any sex offender required to register or to verify pursuant to the provisions of this article 
who fails to register or verify in the manner and within the time periods provided for in 
this article shall be guilty of a class E felony upon conviction for the first offense, and 
upon conviction for a second or subsequent offense shall be guilty of a class D felony.
 N.Y. Correct. Law § 168-t (McKinney 2007). For more on SORNA’s “substantial implementation” 
standard, see discussion infra Part III.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) (2013). If such sex offender had also committed a violent crime under federal law, 
he or she may face up to thirty years imprisonment, separate from the ten-year maximum imprisonment 
provided under subsection (a). See id. § 2250(c)(1)–(2); see also Frumkin, supra note 54, at 317 
(“[P]rosecutions based on violations of SORNA’s criminal provision have been challenged vigorously in 
federal district courts.”).
66. Frumkin, supra note 54, at 318. 
67. Paladino, supra note 26, at 280. The official must also notify “any organization, company, or individual 
who requests notification.” Id. 
68. See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 5. Governor Pataki also testified about the June 2005 murder of a woman in 
the parking garage of the Galleria mall in White Plains, New York, at the hands of a recently paroled 
sex offender. Id.; see also Bailey v. Pataki, 708 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 2013).
69. Zilney & Zilney, supra note 20, at 83–84 (alterations in original) (quoting Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual 
Predators and Social Policy, 23 Crime & Justice, 1998, at 43, 59).
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Since the mid-1970s, anxiety over child sexual abuse has continued to mount to the 
point where Americans now “live in a culture of child abuse.”70
 Due to this upsurge of “moral panic,”71 many have argued that sex offender laws 
have been passed rather hurriedly and, at times, rely insufficiently on empirical 
evidence.72 Still, these laws easily garnered the overwhelming support of the public, 
comprised of citizens who, understandably, hope to protect society’s women and 
children from sex crimes.73 Due to an increased and intense media coverage of sex 
crimes, “the public came to believe there was an epidemic of sexual offending,” and 
thus associated sexual offenses with violence and murder.74 In the 1990s, the public 
developed a “renewed awareness and hatred for sex offenders,”75 evidenced by 
enactment of extensive new protections targeting pedophiles who prey on children 
over the Internet.76
70. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 209, 223 (2001) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).
71. Zilney & Zilney, supra note 20, at 68–69 (2009) (“Using the language of ‘moral panic’ to discuss 
societal responses to sexual offenses is not meant to minimize the consequences to those victimized by 
such offenses. It is instead meant to denote the exaggerated and misdirected nature of societal fear and 
as a response the misdirected policies that have been created that do not serve to effectively prevent 
sexual violence.”).
72. Id. at 83 (“The reality is that sex offenders are a great political target, but that doesn’t mean any law 
under the sun is appropriate.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Illinois Measure Would Move 
Some from Sex Offender List, Associated Press, June 24, 2006)). Even Dr. Schlesinger, a member of the 
2001 Senate Task Force that rewrote Megan’s Law in New Jersey, called the legislation a “feel good 
law.” Schlesinger Interview, supra note 40. He further commented, “No one really knows if it works or 
not.” Id.
73. See Zilney & Zilney, supra note 20, at 84; see also Joel Best, Damned Lies and Statistics: 
Untangling Numbers from the Media, Politicians, and Activists 7 (rev. ed. 2012) (arguing 
that much of the general public accepts at face value the statistics presented in the media even though 
statistics are “products of our social arrangements”); Robin Morse, Note, Federalism Challenges to the 
Adam Walsh Act, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 1753, 1793 (2009) (“Crimes of sexual violence, particularly against 
children, justifiably provoke extreme public rage.”).
74. Zilney & Zilney, supra note 20, at 68.
75. Amanda Moghaddam, Comment, Popular Politics and Unintended Consequences: The Punitive Effect of 
Sex Offender Residency Statutes from an Empirical Perspective, 40 Sw. L. Rev. 223, 226 (2010).
76. See Adler, supra note 70, at 227. In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 
followed by the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act in 1998. Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 
110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (1996), invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 881 (1997) (striking down the 
CDA on First Amendment grounds); Pub. L. No. 105-314, tit. I, 112 Stat. 2974 (1998). In October 
2014, twenty-five years after he was abducted, a new campaign was launched to find Jacob Wetterling, 
the namesake of the Wetterling Act, supporting the belief that child sexual abuse has steadily “become 
the master narrative of our culture[,]  .  .  . eclips[ing] all other crimes.” Adler, supra note 70, at 227 
(“[Child sexual abuse] is, we repeatedly hear, ‘worse than murder.’ We view it as a root cause.” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also New Effort to Be Launched to Find Jacob Wetterling, CBS Minn. (Oct. 11, 2014, 8:15 
AM), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2014/10/11/new-effort-to-be-launched-to-find-jacob-wetterling/.
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iii. thE prObLEM Of statE COMpLianCE With sOrna
 As indicated in Part II, the public’s moral panic over sex crimes has led to quite a 
bit of legislative movement.77 Elected officials are “eager to respond to the national 
cry for stricter laws and penalties,”78 and legislators have largely acted upon these 
urges.79 Yet, while calls for sex offender legislation are “politically popular,”80 the laws 
resulting from the political and media frenzy are not always tailored to achieve 
effective results.81 This disconnect is exemplified when examining state compliance 
with SORNA.
 The chief objective of SORNA is to establish a comprehensive national system 
for the registration of sex offenders.82 More uniform state laws and a centralized 
national database would enable law enforcement to more efficiently and thoroughly 
share information, preventing sex offenders from “slip[ping] through the cracks.”83 
These uniform registration standards are “critical to sew together the patch-work 
quilt of 50 different State attempts to identify and keep track of sex offenders.”84 In a 
federal system like the United States, sex offender registration would prove futile if: 
[R]egistered sex offenders could simply disappear from the purview of the 
registration authorities by moving from one jurisdiction to another, or if 
registration and notification requirements could be evaded by moving from a 
jurisdiction with an effective program to a nearby jurisdiction that required 
little or nothing in terms of registration and notification.85
The foundation of the system’s success relies on full participation and uniformity—
in essence, even if only one state or jurisdiction opts out of SORNA, the federal 
registry would fail.
 Thus, states were given a final implementation deadline of July 27, 2011.86 States 
that did not meet the substantial implementation requirement risked losing ten 
77. See Zilney & Zilney, supra note 20, at 83–98.
78. Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws That Have Swept the 
Country, 58 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 40 (2010).
79. See Moghaddam, supra note 75, at 226–27.
80. Id. at 233.
81. Id. at 245 (“[T]hese laws are the embodiment of popular politics triumphing over rational laws . . . .”).
82. See discussion supra Part II.
83. Grinberg, supra note 18.
84. Logan, supra note 52, at 75 (quoting bill co-sponsor Senator Orrin Hatch). Another co-sponsor, then-
Senator Joseph Biden, also stated: “[t]his is about uniting 50 States in common purpose and in league 
with one another to prevent these lowlifes from slipping through the cracks.” Id. (alteration in original).
85. SORNA Guidelines, supra note 13, at 4. In their testimonies at the Bailey trial, former sex offenders 
Warren and Massei highlighted the disparities among state registration requirements. See supra notes 
8–9 and accompanying text.
86. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (May 7, 2014), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/adam-walsh-child-protection-and-safety-act.aspx. 
Under the AWA, states were required to substantially implement SORNA “within three years of the 
date of enactment, July 25, 2006, or within one year of the development of registry/website software 
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percent of their Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant87 provided by 
Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,88 which allows 
state and local governments to finance a broad range of law enforcement activities, 
such as crime control and prevention and criminal justice reform.89
 The SMART Office90 is responsible for determining, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether a jurisdiction has substantially implemented SORNA’s baseline 
requirements.91 Under the National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification (“Guidelines”) provided by the attorney general, a jurisdiction achieves 
“substantial implementation” of SORNA’s requirements by adopting those specific 
measures which the Guidelines identify.92 Because these measures represent the 
baseline for sex offender registration and notification requirements, jurisdictions 
provided by the U.S. Attorney General, whichever is later.” Enniss, supra note 39, at 705–06. However, 
the attorney general could “provide up to two one-year extensions of this deadline.” SORNA 
Guidelines, supra note 13, at 9. In 2010, the SMART Office released the Sex Offender Registry Tool 
(SORT), a sex offender management application provided to states at no cost to assist in SORNA 
implementation. See Reauthorization of the Adam Walsh Act, SMART Watch (Spring 2011), http://ojp.
gov/smart/smartwatch/11_spring/pfv.html (“SORT makes the registry setup and maintenance process 
as efficient and effective as possible.”). The U.S. Department of Justice also developed the SORNA 
Exchange Portal, a tool providing sex offender registration personnel an Internet-based community that 
is designed to facilitate the sharing of information about sex offenders relocating between jurisdictions. 
See id. For more information on SORNA software, see SORNA Tools, Office Justice Programs, 
http://ojp.gov/smart/sorna_tools.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
87. Initial allocations of the Byrne law enforcement assistance grants are determined based on population 
and violent crime rates, with adjustments made to ensure necessary funding for each state, territory, and 
the District of Columbia. Byrne JAG Grant Reductions Under SORNA, Office Justice Programs, 
http://www.smart.gov/byrneJAG_grant_reductions.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
88. See Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (June 2011), http://www.ncsl.
org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/sex-offender-law-down-to-the-wire.aspx; see also Memorandum 
from David Niss, Staff Attorney to Members of the Law & Justice Interim Comm. for the 62nd Mont. 
Legislature 1 (Jan. 30, 2012) [hereinafter Niss Memorandum], available at http://leg.mt.gov/content/
Committees/Interim/2011-2012/Law-and-Justice/Meeting-Documents/Feb-2012/Legal%20
Memo%20SORNA.pdf. Funding withheld from jurisdictions on account of noncompliance would be 
reallocated either to compliant jurisdictions or to the noncompliant jurisdictions to be used solely for 
SORNA implementation efforts. SORNA Guidelines, supra note 13, at 9.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 3756 (2013); see also Recovery Act: Frequently Asked Questions, Office Justice Programs, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/recovery/FAQ _Overview.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
90. The official web site of the SMART Office lists eleven staff members, headed by Luis C.deBaca. About 
SMART, Office Justice Programs, http://ojp.gov/smart/about.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015). 
C.deBaca was appointed by President Barack Obama in November 2014 as the Director of the Justice 
Department’s SMART Office. See Luis C.deBaca, Director, Office Justice Programs, http://ojp.gov/
smart/bio_debaca.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
91. See SORNA Guidelines, supra note 13, at 9, 11. A jurisdiction is “encouraged to submit information to 
the SMART Office concerning existing and proposed sex offender registration and notification 
provisions with as much lead time as possible, so the SMART Office can . . . work with the submitting 
jurisdictions to overcome any shortfalls or problems.” Id. at 9–10.
92. Id. at 10.
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with stricter laws need not amend their laws to coincide with the requirements 
enumerated in the Guidelines.93
 In assessing compliance, the SMART Office considers the totality of a 
jurisdiction’s rules governing the operation of its registration and notification 
program, including statutes and administrative policies and procedures.94 However, 
the Guidelines stipulate that a jurisdiction’s program cannot qualify as substantially 
implementing the SORNA requirements if it “substitute[s] some basically different 
approach to sex offender registration and notification that does not incorporate 
SORNA’s baseline requirements.”95 Additionally, the substantial implementation 
standard is not met by programs that “dispense wholesale” with SORNA’s main 
requirements.96 The U.S. Department of Justice has made available a twenty-two-
page checklist as a tool to guide jurisdictions in achieving substantial implementation.97 
In order for a SMART Office policy advisor to determine whether a jurisdiction has 
complied with SORNA, this checklist must be submitted to the SMART Office for 
review as part of a “complete substantial implementation package.”98
 Effectively, states only have three viable options in deciding how to respond to 
SORNA’s directive: “(1) don’t comply; (2) substantially comply; or (3) challenge the 
Act’s constitutionality and make reasonable changes.”99 The SMART Office 
acknowledges that state compliance has been an “uphill battle”;100 in its most recent 
93. See SMART General FAQs, Office Justice Programs, http://ojp.gov/smart/faq_general.htm (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2015). There is one exception to this rule: SORNA requires that “victim identity, 
registrant Social Security Number, registrants’ arrests not resulting in conviction, and passport and 
immigration information [] be excluded from publicly accessible state sex offender web sites.” Id.
94. See SORNA Guidelines, supra note 13, at 9.
95. Id. at 10. For example, a risk assessment approach that broadly authorizes the waiver or limitation of 
registration or notification requirements on the basis of factors that SORNA does not recognize would 
not be approved as substantially implementing SORNA. Id.
96. Id. Listed examples include: “adopting general standards that do not require registration for offenses 
included in SORNA’s offense coverage provisions, [] set[ting] regular reporting periods for changes in 
registration information that are longer than those specified in SORNA, [and] prescrib[ing] less 
frequent appearances for verification or shorter registration periods than SORNA requires.” Id.
97. See SORNA Checklist, supra note 64. While encouraging jurisdictions to utilize the checklist, the 
SMART Office has also advised that the checklist is not exhaustive, and jurisdictions should therefore 
“work closely with their assigned policy advisors throughout the implementation process to ensure that all 
the necessary issues for substantial implementation are addressed.” Resources: SORNA Checklist, Office 
Justice Programs, http://ojp.gov/smart/smartwatch/10_winter/checklist.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
98. Submitting Substantial Implementation Materials to the SMART Office, Office Justice Programs, 
http://ojp.gov/smart/sorna_tools_materials.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
99. Enniss, supra note 39, at 714. SORNA contains special provisions for cases in which the jurisdiction’s 
highest court has held that the state constitution conflicts with SORNA requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 
16925(b) (2013). In fact, Congress expressly provided that a state need not adopt any AWA requirement 
that is declared unconstitutional by the state’s highest court. Id. § 16925(b)(1). In such cases, the 
SMART Office will work with the jurisdiction to resolve the problem. Id. § 16925(b)(2). If the problem 
cannot be overcome, the SMART Office may approve of reasonable alternative measures consistent 
with the purposes of SORNA. Id. § 16925(b)(3); see also SORNA Guidelines, supra note 13, at 11.
100. Grinberg, supra note 18.
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update, only seventeen states, three territories, and eighty tribes were found to have 
substantially implemented SORNA’s requirements.101
 States have created working groups or committees to weigh the various policy 
considerations in their approaches to implementing SORNA.102 Although the reasons 
for state noncompliance stem from both economic and substantive concerns,103 many of 
the working groups have focused mainly on the fiscal costs and benefits in their analysis 
of whether to implement SORNA.104 At least seven states have explicitly expressed 
apprehension over the fiscal difficulties of implementing SORNA.105 The financial 
cost-benefit justification for noncompliance seems especially reasonable, as states do 
not want the reputation of being either “soft on crime” or safe havens for sex offenders 
seeking to avoid registration requirements.106
 In attempting to comply with SORNA, states expect to incur significant costs in 
various areas, including: additional personnel; new software installation and 
maintenance; additional jail and prison space; increased court and administrative 
needs; law enforcement, including the need to verify information at more frequent 
intervals; and legislative costs associated with adopting and crafting state laws.107
101. See SORNA Substantial Implementation Update, SMART Watch (Summer 2014), http://www.smart.gov/
smartwatch/14_summer/news-1.html. July 27, 2010 was the implementation deadline for the 
comprehensive national system for the registration of sex offenders. Cost-Benefit Analyses of SORNA 
Implementation, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures (Jan. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-
criminal-justice/cost-benefit-analyses-of-sorna-implementation.aspx. The SMART Office identified the 
following states as having met the compliance deadline: Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Jurisdictions That Have Substantially Implemented SORNA, 
Office Justice Programs, http://ojp.gov/smart/newsroom_jurisdictions_sorna.htm (last visited Apr. 
25, 2015). Additionally, the U.S. territory of Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands were found to be in compliance with SORNA. Id.
102. See Cost-Benefit Analyses of SORNA Implementation, supra note 101; see also Sex Offender Law: Down to 
the Wire, supra note 88 (“At a hearing  .  .  . of the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Security to review the Adam Walsh Act, of which SORNA is a part, Chair James 
Sensenbrenner, a key backer of SORNA, expressed his displeasure with the vast majority of states that 
have not complied with the law so far.”).
103. In a 2009 survey, common substantive concerns reported by the states were: technological modifications, 
constitutional challenges, difficulties with implementation of juvenile requirements, and various legislative 
obstacles, including uncertainty over approval of implementing legislation. See The Nat’l Consortium 
for Justice Info. & Statistics, SEARCH Survey on State Compliance with the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) 3–9 (Apr. 2009) [hereinafter Survey on Compliance 
with SORNA], available at http://www.search.org/files/pdf/SORNA-StateComplianceSurvey2009.pdf. 
104. See Cost-Benefit Analyses of SORNA Implementation, supra note 101.
105. See Survey on Compliance with SORNA, supra note 103, at 2. States that identified cost or lack of 
funding as a main barrier to SORNA compliance include: California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Maine, Oregon, and West Virginia. See id. 3–9. 
106. Enniss, supra note 39, at 714 (“[I]t would be political suicide to not comply with the Adam Walsh Act.”).
107. See What Will It Cost to Comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act?, Justice Pol’y 
Inst., http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-08_FAC_SORNACosts_JJ.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2015).
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 Notably, in every state, the first year costs of SORNA implementation outweigh 
the cost of losing ten percent of the state’s Byrne funding.108 In California, the Sex 
Offender Management Board recommended that the state legislature, governor, and 
citizens elect not to comply with the AWA, emphasizing the “substantial” and 
“un-reimbursed” costs associated with the law.109 A study by the Texas Senate 
Criminal Justice Committee also found that losing ten percent of federal justice 
funding was an inadequate incentive to comply with SORNA,110 estimating that “it 
would cost $38.7 million to comply, but the state would lose only about $1.4 million 
in Byrne funds if it refused.”111
 Additionally, the SORNA program itself is underfunded, and Congress has 
failed to allocate consistent funding to underwrite the significant compliance costs 
incurred by state and local governments,112 giving a mere $39 million to forty-three 
states in 2011.113 State leaders frequently refer to SORNA as an “unfunded mandate” 
and describe a “disturbing disconnect” in withholding funds that support services to 
help states meet the federal requirements.114 Further, any grants that local law 
enforcement receive go toward financing the extensive registry requirements and 
enforcing its attendant criminal provisions.115
108. Id.; Adam Walsh Act: Statement of Position, Cal. Sex Offender Mgmt. Board 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.opd.ohio.gov/AWA_Information/AWA_CA_SOMB_SORNA_Position_Paper.pdf 
(“Instead of incurring the substantial—and un-reimbursed—costs associated with the Adam Walsh Act, 
California should absorb the comparatively small loss of federal funds that would result from not accepting 
the very costly and ill-advised changes to state law and policy required by the Act.”). The California Sex 
Offender Management Board cited an assessment by the state attorney general’s office that the costs of 
implementing SORNA far exceeded the penalty of reduced justice assistance funds. Id. at 3.
109. Adam Walsh Act: Statement of Position, supra note 108. 
110. See Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire, supra note 88. The Texas Senate recommendation also offered 
public safety reasons not to comply with SORNA. See id. (“Senator John Whitmire, chairman of the 
Criminal Justice Committee, says the federal mandates are no better than Texas’ laws that restrict 
parole and commit or supervise offenders based on their dangerousness.”).
111. Id. Another example is Montana. Because Montana law requires the offender to be classified based upon a 
risk assessment scheme, the National Conference of State Legislatures reported that Montana would lose 
$87,600 in federal grant money in 2012. See SORNA Noncompliance Penalties, Nat’l Conf. St. 
Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/cj/jagstatedollars.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 
2015).
112. See Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire, supra note 88. The California Sex Offender Management Board 
labeled SORNA “[a]n Unfunded Mandate.” Adam Walsh Act: Statement of Position, supra note 108, at 3.
113. See Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire, supra note 88.
114. Id. Representative Pat Colloton of Kansas told a U.S. House subcommittee: 
It is troubling that states that don’t have the resources to accommodate what is a 
tremendously costly unfunded mandate will have to watch as the very services our 
criminal justice systems rely upon are cut even further. . . . Particularly in this economy, 
no state can afford a significant new unfunded mandate to change public safety approaches 
already undertaken.
 Id.
115. See Frumkin, supra note 54, at 315.
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 Susan Frederick, federal affairs counsel for the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, thoughtfully commented on the states’ dilemma: “States are very 
sympathetic to the need to supervise and penalize registered sex offenders. . . . But 
any time you’re going to be collecting and cataloging information on more people 
more often, that comes at a high cost. The question is whether it’s worth it.”116 
Unfortunately, the manner in which SORNA frames this economic cost-benefit 
question gives states a number of reasons to choose not to comply with the program. 
iV. fisCaL rEspOnsEs tO thE sOrna COMpLianCE prObLEM
 There are three practical routes the federal government can take to reframe the 
financial cost-benefit analysis for state SORNA compliance. Congress can: 
(1) give states more incentive to comply by increasing the percentage of Byrne budget 
cuts (subject to constitutional limitations); (2) provide more funding to states to 
further assist them in executing SORNA requirements; or (3) relax one or more of 
the requirements that impose the greatest financial burdens on the states.
 A. Create More Financial Incentive for States to Comply
 Congress has authority under its Article I spending power to use federal funds to 
encourage state compliance with federal policy goals.117 However, since compliance is 
discretionary, a state need not comply with any of the SORNA guidelines if the state 
is willing to forgo the ten percent funding incentive by the federal government.118 
This option has been recommended to states by a number of SORNA opponents, 
and at least some states have debated whether the costs of complying with the law 
outweigh its financial benefits.119 This is unsurprising because studies have shown 
that, in all fifty states, the first-year costs of implementing SORNA outweigh losing 
ten percent of the state’s Byrne grant.120 Therefore, one obvious solution to foster 
compliance is to increase the size of the Byrne funding cut.121
116. Grinberg, supra note 18.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 109 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Congress can use its spending powers 
to coerce conduct consistent with its views of the general welfare in ways that it perhaps could not 
otherwise command.”).
118. See Frumkin, supra note 54, at 337.
119. Id.
120. See generally What Will It Cost to Comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act?, supra 
note 107. In 2014, the lower end of state Byrne grants included North Dakota ($481,818); Vermont 
($483,863); South Dakota ($542,154); and Wyoming ($566,603). Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 State Edward 
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Allocations, Bureau Justice Assistance, https://www.
bja.gov/%5CFunding%5C14JAGStateAllocations.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2015) [hereinafter 2014 JAG 
Allocations]. The highest 2014 state Byrne grants were California ($19,301,034); Texas ($13,849,044); 
Florida ($11,779,285); and New York ($9,852,423). Id. Of the above listed states, Florida, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming have currently achieved substantial implementation of the SORNA requirements. 
See SORNA, supra note 53. 
121. See Ted Gest, Feds Begin Penalizing States That Haven’t Adopted U.S. Sex Offender Law, Crime Report 
(Apr. 12, 2012, 4:37 AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/viewpoints/2012-04-sorna (“In practice, the 
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 Constitutional limitations on Congress’s spending power must be taken into 
account with any conditional spending approach. In the 2012 case, National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
congressional spending power cannot be used to violate the “basic principle that the 
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program.”122 In essence, the amount of the budget cut must not be “so 
coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”123 Still, it is 
possible for Congress to increase the ten percent Byrne budget cut, consistent with 
constitutional limits, so as to provide a stronger financial incentive for the states to 
comply with SORNA.124 In Sebelius, states that opted out of the Medicaid expansion 
faced (on average) losses of more than $1 billion in Medicaid funding each year.125 
Based on the states’ Byrne grants in 2014, a ten percent cut would range from $48,182 
to $1,930,103—even a substantial increase on these figures is unlikely to meet the 
coercion threshold condemned in Sebelius.126
 B. Provide More State Funding
 A second alternative to the financial problem posed by SORNA implementation is 
to give states more money in order to make compliance financially more attractive. 
SORNA specifically authorizes the Sex Offender Management Assistance grant 
program to help offset SORNA implementation costs, granting positive funding 
assistance to all eligible jurisdictions.127 It also allows for enhanced payments to 
jurisdictions that achieve compliance within one or two years of SORNA’s enactment.128
cuts ordered by [the] Justice Department will not go so deeply. Only federal money going solely to state 
governments will suffer the 10 percent reduction, not the relatively large amount of U.S. aid destined for 
local governments.”). For a full list of SORNA noncompliance penalties, see SORNA Noncompliance 
Penalties, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/cj/jagstatedollars.
pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
122. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
123. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 
590 (1937)).
124. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Medicaid expansion provision was found to 
be coercive because the penalty for noncompliance (i.e., taking away the states’ existing Medicaid 
funding) “threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget,” which the Court deemed 
“economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce.” 132 S. Ct. at 2605. 
Thus, it was not the percentage of the cut but the total dollar amount that was dispositive in Sebelius. In 
South Dakota v. Dole, the Court had approved a 5 percent cut to federal highway funds (on the condition 
that states adopt the federal drinking age of 21) as non-coercive and without hesitation. 483 U.S. at 211 
(“When we consider, for a moment, that all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course 
as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5 [percent] of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified 
highway grant programs, the argument as to coercion is shown to be more rhetoric than fact.”).
125. See Kenneth R. Thomas, Cong. Research Serv., R42367, The Constitutionality of Federal 
Grant Conditions After NatioNal FederatioN oF iNdepeNdeNt BusiNess v. seBelius 2 (2012).
126. See 2014 JAG Allocations, supra note 120.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 16926(a) (2013).
128. Id. § 16926(c); see also SORNA Guidelines, supra note 13, at 11.
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 In 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice announced more than $17 million in 
fiscal year grant assistance for states, territories, and tribal governments that 
implement SORNA’s sex offender programming.129 Roughly $13 million of the 2014 
total is allocated to specifically further the objectives of SORNA.130 The amount of 
federal funding for SORNA implementation seems stagnant. In 2013, the U.S. 
Department of Justice awarded approximately $13.3 million to forty-seven 
jurisdictions in order to further the objectives of SORNA.131 In 2012, $13.69 million 
was awarded to fifty-six jurisdictions.132
 Although these grants are considerable, SORNA-targeted funding has not 
increased in recent years and is still nowhere near sufficient when looking at each 
state’s actual implementation costs, which have been estimated to be as high as $59.2 
million in California, $38.8 million in Texas, and $31.3 million in New York—
figures that far exceed the total sum of federal assistance granted in 2013.133 Thus, 
there must be a significant increase in federal assistance aimed at furthering SORNA 
goals to make a tangible difference in state compliance.134
 C. Cut Implementation Costs
 A third possible solution for lessening SORNA’s financial strain on the states is to 
reconsider the substantial implementation standard and to relax some of its requirements,135 
129. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Justice Department Announces $17.6 
Million in Awards to Support Sex Offender Registration, Intervention and Treatment (Sept. 19, 2014), 
http://ojp.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2014/ojppr092914.pdf.
130. See id.; see also Funding Opportunities, Office Justice Programs, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/
funding.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015). The number of jurisdictions that received SORNA funding for 
the year of 2014 was not specified. See id.
131. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Justice Department Announces $15.5 
Million in Awards to Support Sex Offender Registration, Assessment, Intervention (Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://ojp.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2013/ojppr091613.pdf; see also Funding Opportunities, supra note 
130. The remaining $2.2 million will be used to fund four different related projects: “Sex Offender 
Treatment Intervention and Progress Scale (SOTIPS) project sites support, the Sex Offender 
Management Fellowship program, the SORNA Tribal Training and Technical Assistance Program, 
and . . . the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website (NSOPW) operation.” Justice Department 
Announces $15.5 Million in Awards to Support Sex Offender Registration, Assessment, Intervention, Cal. 
Reform Sex Offender Laws (Sept. 16, 2013), http://californiarsol.org/2013/09/justice-department-
announces-15-5-million-in-awards-to-support-sex-offender-registration-assessment-intervention/.
132. Funding Opportunities, supra note 130. The details of funding grants in subsequent years are also listed 
on the SORNA web site. See id.
133. See What Will It Cost to Comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act?, supra note 107.
134. For a more in-depth discussion on the process of federal funding to states and local governments, see 
Cong. Budget Office, Federal Grants to State and Local Governments (2013), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/43967_FederalGrants.pdf.
135. The Guidelines explicitly state that there is “some latitude” in evaluating a jurisdiction’s implementation 
efforts, which means that states need not follow the SORNA specifications exactly. SORNA Guidelines, 
supra note 13, at 10.
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the value of which policymakers have already begun to question.136 Rather than 
targeting known sex offenders, a significant portion of the resources given to states are 
being devoted to the administrative maintenance of the registry and notification 
systems,137 which have not achieved SORNA’s goal to protect communities from sexual 
offenses.138 At this point, focusing federal funding on amending SORNA’s shortcomings 
may be a better allocation of current resources than attempting to enforce its 
implementation in noncompliant jurisdictions.139
 Congress could choose to relax SORNA compliance requirements in order to 
lessen the financial strain on the states in three ways: (1) allow states to keep their 
own sex offender classification systems; (2) allow states to follow their own philosophy 
of juvenile justice; and (3) reduce the frequency of in-person appearance requirements. 
  1. Allow States to Keep Risk-Assessment Based Classification Systems
 SORNA institutes a three-tiered system, ranking sex offenders based upon the 
severity of the committed offense. Each tier requires a different time span for which 
the sex offender must be registered and imposes distinct verification appearance 
requirements.140 While jurisdictions need not label their sex offenders according to 
SORNA’s three-tiered system, a jurisdiction must ensure that sex offenders who 
meet the substantive criteria for placement in a particular tier are, at a minimum, 
136. See Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire, supra note 88 (“State sex offender registries already contain 
names, addresses, photos, vehicle, job and other identifying information on hundreds of thousands of 
convicted sex offenders. If public safety is the goal of maintaining all these public registries, it’s not clear 
if all the information makes communities safer or if the most dangerous predators become lost among a 
growing swell of electronic information.”).
137. See What Will It Cost to Comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act?, supra note 107.
138. See id. (“Registries and notification have not been proven to protect communities from sexual offenses, 
and may even distract from more effective approaches.”). 
139. See Frumkin, supra note 54, at 356 (“One of the biggest problems with SORNA, and registration 
systems generally in the United States, is the extensive community notification. Congress should take a 
cue from other countries and outspoken organizations and diminish community notification.”). 
140. Paladino, supra note 26, at 281.
A tier I sex offender is defined as a “sex offender other than a tier II or tier III sex 
offender.” A tier I sex offender is required to register on the sex registry for fifteen 
years, and must verify once every year. A tier II sex offender is defined as “a sex offender 
other than a tier III sex offender whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for more 
than 1 year” and the offense falls into one of two categories. A tier II sex offender is 
required to stay on the registry for twenty-five years, and must report in person every 
six months. A tier III sex offender is defined as a sex offender “whose offense is 
punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year” and the offense: (1) is comparable or 
more severe than aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse; (2) is abusive sexual contact 
against a minor twelve years or younger; or (3) involves kidnapping of a minor. A tier 
III sex offender is required to stay on the registry for life, and must report in person to 
the jurisdiction every three months.
 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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subject to “the duration of registration, frequency of in-person appearances for 
verification, and extent of website disclosure that SORNA requires for that tier.”141
 In 2011, SMART Office officials told a U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee 
“that SORNA’s tiered classification system [was] a barrier for at least 11 states.”142 
Lawmakers must work to reclassify crimes and change notification practices in the 
states that fail to meet the federal three-tier requirements.143 The implementation 
costs of the federal classification method are substantial because many offenders 
must then be added to the state registry, which further increases administrative 
costs.144 Currently, at least half of the fifty states use risk-based assessment systems145 
to classify sexual offenders (rather than the SORNA three-tier system).146
 Moreover, comprehensive studies have shown that actuarial risk assessment 
scores consistently outperform the SORNA tier system in accurately predicting 
sexual re-offending.147 Some states—for example, Montana and New York—have 
explained that their refusal to comply with SORNA is based on SORNA’s mandate 
to adopt the federal three-tier system.148
141. SORNA Guidelines, supra note 13, at 22.
142. Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire, supra note 88.
143. See id.
144. See Niss Memorandum, supra note 88, at 2 (“[T]he federal classification system would add more 
offenders to the state registry and thereby make the registry more expensive to administer.”). The 
California Sex Offender Management Board estimated a $770,000 one-time cost—at a minimum—to 
reclassify currently registered offenders. Adam Walsh Act: Statement of Position, supra note 108, at 3.
145. SORNA and Sex Offender Policy in the States, Council St. Gov’ts, Winter 2010, at 6 [hereinafter 
Council St. Gov’ts], available at http://www.csg.org/policy/documents/SORNABriefFINAL.pdf.
146. “Under SORNA, offenders are categorized based on their offense, rather than by their risk to re-offend.” 
Id. Eliminating SORNA’s offense-based tier system would also lessen the burden on states using an 
undifferentiated offense-based approach (states that would otherwise have to enact more tailored laws to 
achieve compliance with SORNA).
147. See, e.g., Kristen M. Zgoba et al., A Multi-state Recidivism Study Using Static-99R and Static-2002 Risk 
Scores and Tier Guidelines from the Adam Walsh Act, Doc. No. 240099, at 4 (Nov. 2012), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240099.pdf. A November 2012 multi-state recidivism study, 
funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, examined the Static-99R and Static-2002 risk assessment 
tools in comparison with the Tier Guidelines from the AWA. See generally id.
The findings call into question the accuracy and utility of the AWA classification 
system in detecting high-risk sex offenders and applying concordant risk management 
strategies. If decision-making is [to] be driven by assigning offenders into defined risk 
classes, those categories must be determined by empirically derived procedures that are 
most likely to correctly identify higher risk offenders in a meaningful, systematic, and 
hierarchical manner.
 Id. at 4.
148. See Niss Memorandum, supra note 88, at 2 (“For Montana, that noncomplying method of offender 
classification is problematic because the use of the risk assessment method for classification is mandated 
by statute.”); see also Letter from Risa S. Sugarman, Deputy Comm’r & Dir., Office of Sex Offender 
Mgmt., to Linda Baldwin, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1–2 (Aug. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Sugarman 
Letter], available at http://media.navigatored.com/documents/NY+Baldwin+SORNA+notification.pdf 
(“After examining the proposed federal approach which focuses on the crime of conviction, we are 
702
Paying the PiPer: the Cost of ComPlianCe with sorna NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 59 | 2014/15
 Even assuming that risk assessment is not a superior tool for predicting recidivism, 
the purely financial rationale for allowing states to keep their own classification 
system remains valid. The offense-based tier system “pulls too many offenders onto 
the registry”—costing significantly more resources to register and maintain—and 
thus overburdens law enforcement.149 Removing the tier system requirement would 
eliminate enormous costs for many states that identify this financial constraint as a 
primary obstacle to implementing SORNA.
  2. Allow States to Follow Their Own Philosophy of Juvenile Justice.
 SORNA is the first federal law that requires juveniles to register as adult sex 
offenders.150 Individual states have existing systems in place to properly punish 
serious juvenile sex offenders.151 Many of these states have elected to exclude juveniles 
from registration outright, while others have left the issue to judicial discretion.152 
For instance, in Utah, juvenile sex offenders are committed to the division of Juvenile 
Justice Services and detained thirty days prior to the individual’s twenty-first 
birthday.153 Upon release, the juvenile-court judge decides whether the offender will 
be subject to registration requirements.154
 According to SMART Office officials, the juvenile registration requirements are 
“[t]he most significant barrier” to compliance155 and conflict with certain state laws 
regarding the confidentiality of juvenile records, prompting important public policy 
concerns about juvenile rehabilitation goals.156 Adding juvenile offenders to the adult 
registry would increase the number of offenders in the system and may require adding 
separate reporting facilities—resulting in heavy administration and maintenance costs.
concerned that the federal approach may both over- and understate threat in a way that is not consistent 
with [New York’s] public safety goals.”).
149. Grinberg, supra, note 18.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (2013) (“The term ‘convicted’ or a variant thereof, used with respect to a sex 
offense, includes adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years 
of age or older at the time of the offense and the offense adjudicated was comparable to or more severe 
than aggravated sexual abuse . . . .”).
151. See Enniss, supra note 39, at 714.
152. See Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire, supra note 88.
153. Enniss, supra note 39, at 714–15.
154. Id. at 715.
155. See Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire, supra note 88. Ohio was found to have substantially implemented 
SORNA requirements even though its juvenile-sex-offender registration laws deviated from SORNA’s 
minimal requirements. See Paladino, supra note 26, at 298–300; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, SORNA 
Implementation Review: State of Ohio 2–3 (2009), available at http://www.smart.gov/pdfs/sorna/
Ohio.pdf.
156. See Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire, supra note 88.
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 At least twenty-three states cited SORNA’s application to the juvenile population 
as a barrier to compliance.157 If states were allowed to maintain their own philosophy 
of juvenile justice in approaching juvenile-sex-offender registration, then a major 
obstacle to gaining universal state compliance would be eliminated.
  3. Relax the In-Person Registration Requirements of SORNA
 Lastly, SORNA requires an offender to make periodic appearances before a law 
enforcement agency to verify certain matters, such as where the offender is residing.158 
The increased frequency requirements mandated by SORNA impose substantial 
maintenance costs on the states, especially due to the increased personnel needed to 
administer these requirements.159 At least eight states have complained that the 
in-person reporting and increased verification requirements pose substantial hurdles 
to SORNA compliance.160 In California, it was estimated to cost local law enforcement 
agencies at least $10 million to meet the new frequency of registration requirement161—
the benefits of which are arguably an unnecessary obstacle to achieving national 
compliance with SORNA.
 The cost-reduction methods identified above are but a few examples of potential 
measures that Congress could take to both lessen the financial burden on states and 
facilitate compliance with SORNA. More important is the reminder that SORNA’s 
core objective lies in establishing and improving the national baseline of registration 
and notification standards so that fewer offenders will become “lost” within the 
157. See Council St. Gov’ts, supra note 145, at 4. See, e.g., Sugarman Letter, supra note 148, at 2 (“New 
York has a long standing public policy of treating juvenile offenders differently from adult offenders so 
that juveniles have the best opportunity of rehabilitation and re-integration. The federal requirement 
that juveniles be placed on the Sex Offender Registry under SORNA is in direct conflict with that 
public policy.”); Adam Walsh Act: Statement of Position, supra note 108, at 3 (“If California were to adopt 
the Adam Walsh Act the state would, for the first time, include juveniles over the age of 14, determined 
to be a tier three risk, on the public Megan’s Law website. . . . There is no evidence, to date, that the 
inclusion of juvenile offenders into public registries increases public safety or promotes effective juvenile 
offender reentry.”).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 16916 (2013).
A sex offender shall appear in person, allow the jurisdiction to take a current photograph, 
and verify the information in each registry in which that offender is required to be 
registered not less frequently than—(1) each year, if the offender is a tier I sex offender; 
(2) every 6 months, if the offender is a tier II sex offender; and (3) every 3 months, if the 
offender is a tier III sex offender.
 Id.
159. See Sex Offender Law: Down to the Wire, supra note 88. The SMART Office provides that it will consider 
alternatives to interim in-person appearances for Tier II and Tier III offenders. See SORNA “In-Person” 
Registration Requirements, Office Justice Programs, http://ojp.gov/smart/registration_requirements.
htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).
160. See Survey on Compliance with SORNA, supra note 103. As of April 2009, these states were 
Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See id.
161. See Adam Walsh Act: Statement of Position, supra note 108, at 3. These verification and in-person appearance 
costs are projected to increase significantly due to ongoing staffing expenses. Id.
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system. If SORNA’s goal is to maximize the effectiveness of sex offender registration 
and notification on a national level, steps must be taken to encourage states to comply 
with SORNA’s most crucial aspects, rather than give states the financial incentive to 
abandon it altogether.
V. thE iMpLiCatiOn Of fEdEraList prinCipLEs
 Some of SORNA’s costly requirements add another layer to the equation: the 
implication of federalism principles. The federal government is given a few defined 
areas of authority prescribed in Article I of the Constitution, and the Tenth 
Amendment reserves the balance of authority to the states—including the “police 
power.”162 For most of the first half of the twentieth century, federal involvement in 
criminal justice matters remained “limited and episodic” because state and local 
governments handled them.163 Over time, the federal government has become 
increasingly involved in the criminal justice system and made “liberal use of its 
Commerce Clause authority to expand its criminal law jurisdiction.”164 However in 
1995, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States vs. Lopez signaled a shift in the 
Court’s willingness to countenance a general legislative power through the commerce 
clause in cases involving non-economic criminal activity.165 Thus, SORNA and other 
criminal justice policies relating to sex offender registration and community 
notification generally were implemented not under Congress’s commerce clause 
authority, “but rather more subtly through its conditional Spending Power authority.”166
 In the 1990s, Congress relied on its spending power “to compel changes in state 
criminal justice policy” with respect to community control of sex offenders.167 
Although once a matter “unmistakably within the historic purview of states,” state 
sex offender registration and notification laws are now “the direct result of federal 
162. Logan, supra note 52, at 53 (describing the “police power” as an “expansive authority James Madison 
regarded as extending ‘to all objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, 
and properties of the people’”). 
163. Id. at 54.
164. Id. at 59 (discussing Congress’s method of coercing state compliance by means of conditional federal 
funding).
165. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as outside the scope of 
Congress’s commerce clause authority); see also Christopher DiPompeo, Comment, Federal Hate Crime 
Laws and United States v. Lopez: On a Collision Course to Clarify Jurisdictional-Element Analysis, 157 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 617, 618 (2008) (“[Lopez] signaled the modern Court’s resistance to allowing Congress to 
exercise a general legislative power through the Commerce Clause, particularly in cases involving non-
economic criminal activity.”).
166. Logan, supra note 52, at 52. “Since 1994, Congress has repeatedly imposed new registration requirements 
on the states” through its Article I spending power. Id. at 69. Note, however, that Congress did use its 
commerce clause authority—and not its spending clause authority—to impose federal criminal liability 
for registration violations under the AWA. See id. at 79.
167. See id. at 59. The federal government had moved to nationalize disparate state approaches to sex offender 
registration and community notification. See id. at 121–22 (“That the shift has occurred via federal use 
of the ‘Trojan horse’ of conditional spending power authority, rather than through the more controversial 
method of Commerce Clause authority, does not alter the outcome.”).
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initiative and preference.”168 Many of the requirements imposed by SORNA require 
major changes to state laws—most notably, the juvenile registration requirements—
and arguably infringe on traditional state autonomy.169 Furthermore, the lingering 
reluctance of many states to abandon their own local sex offender system suggests 
that noncompliance with SORNA may, in certain aspects, better serve the state’s 
local interests and values.170
Vi. COnCLUsiOn
 The principal objective of the AWA, and specifically SORNA, was to strengthen 
the national network of sex offender registration and notification. The hope was to 
eliminate loopholes to prevent sex offenders from easily evading the system by 
relocating to “safe haven” states. Full compliance—by all fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, the five principal U.S. territories, and the Indian tribes—is essential to 
create a true national registry system in the United States. Therefore, in order to 
realize the key purpose of SORNA, the persistent problem of state noncompliance 
needs to be acknowledged and addressed. 
 Cost-related concerns have been a constant factor in all fifty states’ analyses in 
deciding whether to implement SORNA, and hundreds of millions of dollars have 
already been invested into establishing these national sex offender registration and 
notification programs. Since Congress has committed to intervening in the criminal 
justice system in order to achieve a national registry, it must reevaluate its fiscal 
approach to SORNA. Specifically, the federal government must take steps to reform 
the financial structure of the SORNA implementation plan without losing focus of 
the long-term goal of national compliance.
 Politicians have been fighting a war against sexual offenders for years with much 
passion and determination—but with less attention paid to the details of their battle 
plan. The problem with SORNA compliance can be resolved with a closer 
examination of implementation costs and benefits, and with much needed flexibility. 
It is time to pay the piper and begin changing the tune of the approach to sex offender 
legislation—for the sake of efficiency, efficacy, and principle. 
168. Id. at 52, 59.
169. See id. at 88–89 (“With the AWA, federal intrusiveness has reached a high water mark, . . . for instance 
subjecting certain juveniles to registration and notification and requiring in-person registration 
verification.”).
170. See discussion supra Part III.
